Can the IRS Search My Emails? The Lesson from Mukhi

Although the IRS has significant administrative powers to seek taxpayer information, those powers are often checked by federal law and courts. Nevertheless, the agency does have the authority in federal court to seek relevant information from third parties or taxpayers themselves, provided the information is not protected. Because federal court discovery rules are broad, many taxpayers are surprised at what information the IRS can lawfully seek. Indeed, a recent Tax Court case, Mukhi v. Comm’r, shows that even personal emails can be subject to production and disclosure.

Background Facts

According to the government filings in Mukhi, the taxpayer, a U.S. citizen, created foreign entities and accounts in Liechtenstein. The government learned of the foreign entities and accounts and sought civil fraud and information return penalties against Mukhi.

During the IRS exam and Tax Court litigation, the IRS sought information on Mukhi directly from the Lichtenstein Tax Authority. The Tax Authority provided the agency with approximately five years of emails between Mukhi and his foreign advisors. The emails also suggested that Mukhi used two alias email accounts with Yahoo and Google.

After reviewing the communications, the IRS filed a Motion for Document Subpoena Hearing (Motion). In the Motion, the IRS indicated that it intended to issue subpoenas to Yahoo and Google to recover more of the email communications. The Motion also suggested that the IRS would seek a subpoena related to Mukhi’s sister, who was identified in the documents provided to the agency by the Tax Authority.

The Tax Court granted the Motion, scheduling the hearing on February 11, 2026.

Can the IRS Seek Personal Emails?

The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq (SCA) provides some limited protection against the unlawful disclosure of emails to third parties, including the government. Under the SCA, the government may not obtain “wire or electronic communications” that have been in electronic storage for 180 days or less without a search warrant. With respect to older emails, the statute permits the government to seek those communications directly from the email provider if the government obtains a subpoena or a “specific and articulable facts” court order, provided prior notice is provided to the party holding the email account.

At least one federal court has held that the SCA violates the Fourth Amendment. In U.S. v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2011), the court held:

The government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause. Therefore, because they did not obtain a warrant, the government agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they obtained the contents of Warshak’s emails. Moreover, to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.

Significantly, the SCA requires email providers to comply with a request for disclosure where the person who originated or received the email provides lawful consent for the disclosure. Courts have generally concluded that parties to litigation, such as Mukhi, may be compelled by court process to give their actual consent. See, e.g., O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App.4th 1423 (2006) (“Where a party to the communication is also a party to the litigation, it would seem within the power of a court to require his consent to disclosure on pain of discovery sanctions.”). Therefore, absent Fourth Amendment arguments, the Tax Court may issue an order that requires Mukhi to provide his consent to disclosure of the email addresses.

Of course, other arguments may apply to limit the disclosure. For example, the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure provide that the court may modify or quash a subpoena to the extent it violates a recognized privilege. In the Motion, Mukhi’s counsel apparently intends to argue that the subpoena should be modified or quashed due to attorney-client privilege concerns. The IRS contends that Mukhi’s contentions are “hypothetical at this point,” but expect the court to address this argument in the February 11, 2026, hearing.

Conclusion

The IRS’ actions in Mukhi demonstrate that the agency may attempt to seek emails from taxpayers more in litigation. To the extent taxpayers have a constitutional protection or privilege to object to such a disclosure, taxpayers should be ready to raise these arguments or risk waiving them altogether.

For any questions about this blog post or any other legal or tax-related matter, please feel free to contact mrobets@meadowscollier.com.